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 ABSTRACT 
 
Biofuel policies in the United States were adopted to reduce dependence on crude oil, 
boost farm incomes, and benefit the environment. However, recent literature has focused on the 
negative effects of biofuels on crop and food markets in terms of increasing price levels and 
volatility. Corn ethanol policy in the United States has created new price linkages between the 
corn, ethanol, and gasoline markets.  
Grain storage has the ability to mitigate price volatility. Thus, a better understanding of 
grain storage in the new environment of biofuels is warranted. The competitive grain storage 
model is extended to include these linkages. Four policies are considered: no policy, an ethanol 
consumption mandate, an excise tax credit, and both a mandate and tax credit together. The 
results show that the application of biofuel policy increases the expected price of corn and 
increases the amount of corn stored.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
  The adoption of biofuel policies has created a new link between oil prices and farm level 
prices for agricultural commodities such as corn (Tyner and Taheripour 2007). Biofuel policies 
were adopted in the hopes of reducing dependence on foreign oil, improving the environment, 
and improving farm incomes. However, these policies have increased the level and volatility of 
food prices, causing substantial welfare losses and having negative consequences for the 
environment (de Gorter and Just 2010). 
This research seeks to analyze the source of volatility in corn prices by considering the 
price linkages between gasoline, ethanol, and corn within the framework of the competitive 
model for grain storage. By doing so, two previously separate literatures, that studying the role of 
grain storage and that studying the price linkages between corn, ethanol, and oil, are combined. 
This knowledge will contribute to the body of literature exploring the impact of ethanol policy 
on food price level and volatility. Increasing food prices, especially volatile prices, are of 
concern to developing countries across the globe as well as the poor in developed countries 
(Barrett and Bellamare 2011).  
The nature of corn production means there is one harvest per year and the amount of that 
harvest is determined in large part by the weather. Historically, this variation in harvest has been 
the most prominent source of uncertainty in the corn market. The ability to store grain is 
generally understood to mitigate price volatility by absorbing large harvests to support prices and 
releasing those stocks to lessen a price spike (Wright 2011). On a general level, this paper 
explores the role of storage in mitigating food price volatility ethanol policy. We will also 
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explore how ethanol policy has affected the ability to mitigate prices using storage given that 
such a large proportion of the corn crop is currently being used for ethanol. 
The analysis in this thesis seeks to explain what happened in the case of corn-ethanol in 
the United States. Figure 1 below shows how ending stocks went in the opposite direction of 
prices in all years except one: crop year 2007/08 where ending stocks increased with prices. This 
indicates in 2006/07, the increased demand for corn for biofuels was a market aberration – not a 
change in mean price but rather a one-time shock. As prices increased stocks were depleted. But 
in 2007/08, the market realized that biofuels would be a permanent shift in demand and so stocks 
went up with prices. For every year thereafter (at a much higher mean price), stocks and price 
moved in opposite directions as one would expect. For example, the current drought severely 
affecting corn production 2012/13 crop year is being treated by the USDA forecast as an 
aberration as stocks are expected to be depleted as prices rise.  
Understanding how biofuel policy, with oil prices, impact farm level prices for corn in 
the presence of storage has important implications for farm and energy policy in the United 
States and for explaining current market events. The remainder of this chapter focuses on the 
motivation for the research and gives a brief overview of the history of corn ethanol and the 
policies related to it.  
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Figure 1: Corn Ending Stocks versus Price 
 
Source: USDA  
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1.2 Brief History of Corn Ethanol in the United States 
 
Ethanol has long been thought of as an ingredient in fuel; however, it has only recently 
gained traction in the United States. Ethanol has been on the energy radar in the United States 
since the 1920’s. Then it was believed that the peak of petroleum production was near (Carter et 
al. 2011). At the time, new oil reserves were discovered in the US keeping the price of oil and 
gasoline relatively low. Ethanol’s lack of profitability, due to low oil prices and the fact that it is 
35 percent less efficient than regular gasoline kept ethanol from becoming a mainstream fuel 
ingredient (Carter et al. 2011). 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act in 1990 provided another opportunity for ethanol to 
shine. Oxygenate additives, either ethanol or methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), were required 
to be blended into finished gasoline in some regions (Tyner 2008). These additives increase the 
amount of oxygen in gasoline, help fuel burn more completely, and reduce vehicle emissions. 
Because MTBE was cheaper, it became the additive of choice Thus, ethanol would have to wait 
a few more years before it became a major fuel component. Eventually, MTBE was found to 
have contaminated groundwater in several states (MTBE). By 2005, twenty states had banned 
MTBE and it fell out of use in others (Gardner 2007). The door had finally been opened for 
ethanol. 
Biofuel policies have been adopted with the hopes of reducing dependence on oil from a 
national security perspective, improving the environment and increasing agricultural incomes. To 
achieve these policy goals, many policies are/have been employed. These policies include 
consumption subsidies, consumption mandates, import barriers, and environmental sustainability 
standards (Gardner and Tyner 2007).  Additionally, biofuel policies are designed to complement 
other energy policies such as cap & trade and existing fuel taxes (de Gorter and Just 2010). The 
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benefits of biofuels are outlined by de Gorter and Just (2010) and include reducing tax costs of 
farm subsidy programs and improving international terms of trade.   
The primary catalyst for the increase in corn being used for ethanol in the United States 
was the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) introduced in 2005. The RFS sets forth a consumption 
mandate or minimum amount of ethanol in gasoline. The RFS is implemented as a blend 
mandate based on a forecast of the coming year’s total fuel consumption (de Gorter and Just 
2009b). In 2005, when the RFS was introduced, 3 percent of finished gasoline was comprised of 
ethanol. In that same year, 14 percent of corn produced in the United States was used to produce 
fuel ethanol. The RFS percentage was raised to 10 percent in 2007. It is estimated this increase in 
the RFS resulted in a 43 percent increase in the price of corn for 2010 (Drabik 2011). As a result 
of the increase in the RFS the percentage of U.S. corn destined to become fuel ethanol climbed 
to 38 percent in 2008 (Carter et al. 2011). 
In addition to the RFS, there has historically been a volumetric ethanol excise tax credit 
(VEETC) or ethanol tax credit in place. This credit allowed ethanol blenders to receive a federal 
tax credit of $.45 per gallon. When state tax credits are added, the tax credit increases to $.52 per 
gallon (de Gorter and Just 2010). The ethanol tax credit expired at the end of 2011. The RFS and 
VEETC are the policies considered in this paper. 
However, biofuel policies do have downside by increasing both food price levels and 
increasing volatility in both food and energy markets (de Gorter and Just 2010). Further, studies 
reveal that biofuel policies have induced environmental externalities like precipitating land use 
changes that have increased greenhouse gas emissions (Searchinger et al. 2008). Additionally, 
biofuel policies have the potential to cause deadweight losses, which can be quite large (de 
Gorter and Just 2010). 
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In response to recent food price volatility, many explanations have been brought forth 
including a “perfect storm” of factors including low interest rates, high oil prices, catastrophic 
weather events, low world inventories of staple crops, and rampant price speculation. (Wright 
2011). However, not everyone agrees with the “perfect storm” argument. One researcher lays the 
blame squarely on biofuels (de Gorter 2012). Another dismisses recent explanation of interest 
rates, speculative bubbles and input costs on grain price volatility in favor of the competitive 
grain storage model to explain grain market volatility and recent price spikes (Wright 2011). 
This model first put forth by Gustafson (1958) asserts that rational market actors will store grain 
when the expected price next period exceeds the current price by at least the cost to store the 
grain until the next period. In other words, storage is a form of arbitrage or buying low and 
selling high. This arbitrage takes place over time. If prices are expected to rise, then rational 
actors will store grain as long as the expected price increase covers any costs associated with 
storing the grain.  
On a global scale the primary staple grains are wheat, rice, and corn. Historically, normal 
shifters of supply and demand have affected these markets. In the past decade stocks of these 
staples have declined due to the adoption of substantial biofuel mandates (Wright 2011).  In turn, 
low inventories have made these markets particularly sensitive to short-run shocks. Drought is a 
primary example of a short run supply shock. Prior to 2002, corn was becoming increasingly 
popular as more people worldwide began to demand corn-fed animal protein. Another example 
of a demand shock is the demand for biofuels in excess of that required by increasing oil price 
(Wright 2011). That additional demand comes from a variety of policies like blend mandates and 
ethanol tax subsidies. Since 2002, biofuels has become an important source of demand for corn 
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(Wright 2011). In this paper, analysis of biofuel policy is integrated into a model for competitive 
grain storage. 
 
1.3 Combining Two Literatures 
 
Biofuels, especially ethanol, have garnered much attention from news media, politicians, 
and academics alike.  Many pages have been devoted to the welfare impacts of various ethanol 
policies and researchers have postulated new linkages between the previously independent corn, 
ethanol, and gasoline prices. Separately, a literature focusing on modeling grain storage has 
emerged and been tested. By combining these two literatures, this paper seeks to improve the 
understanding the effects of biofuels on the corn market and how newly created price linkages 
affect price volatility in the corn market.  
Figure 2 illustrates the proposed effect of biofuels on storage. Prior to biofuels, stocks 
fluctuated from less than 7.5% of use to more than 22.5% of use. Meanwhile, the corn price 
primarily remained below $3/bushel. During this time, storage was absorbing excess supply in 
years with good harvest. Notice the downward trend to the line. More corn is stored at lower 
prices. In the post biofuel era, the higher trend line prevails at higher prices. Now, a large 
percentage of corn is destined to become corn ethanol. This new trend line represents a new 
equilibrium that will be explored through the lens of grain storage.  
This paper builds on the work of de Gorter and Just (2009a,b) by adding the component 
of grain storage, based on the competitive grain storage model, to their substantial work on 
modeling biofuel policy through price linkages between corn, ethanol, and gasoline. In the 
current work, a model is specified that allows consumers to adjust the ethanol blend they 
purchase based on price and ethanol’s lower contribution to mileage. This knowledge has   
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Figure 2. U.S. Farm Corn Price vs. Feedgrain Stocks/Use Ratio Crops of 1990 to 2012 (Sept. 1 
Crop Years) 
 
Source: USDA 
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important implications for policy in the United States, explaining current market events, and 
worldwide food prices. 
Chapter 2 discusses relevant literature on the topics of the linkage between gasoline, 
ethanol, and corn prices and the competitive storage model. Then, Chapter 3 outlines the 
methodology for the current research. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the results. Chapter 5 
discusses conclusions and recommendations for future research. Following a list of works cited, 
appendices are included of the detailed routine used to solve a model of grain storage with 
biofuel policies.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Setting the Stage 
 
Since gasoline has been an important input to agricultural products through liquid fuel 
and fertilizer, agricultural prices were already linked to energy prices through input costs. With 
the ethanol boom, beginning in 2006, agricultural and energy prices became linked through 
output prices (Trujillo-Barrerra, et al. 2011). Corn, an agricultural output, was now used as an 
input for biofuels.  
This new relationship now caused the price of corn to be affected by the demand for 
ethanol and its market fundamentals. The demand for ethanol as an ingredient in blended fuel is, 
in turn, affected by the demand for gasoline and its market fundamentals. Overarching this 
discussion is the market for raw crude oil that is commonly understood to be much larger than 
the market for ethanol (de Gorter & Just 2010, Serra et al 2011). Furthermore, the oil market is 
highly volatile (de Gorter and Drabik 2012; Serra & Zilberman 2011). In fact, some have gone so 
far as to claim that ethanol production is a response to volatility in oil prices (Trujillo-Barrerra et 
al. 2011).  
The literature regarding biofuel policy has been explored by proving agricultural and 
energy prices were linked, studying the price level transmission, and understanding the 
contributors to price volatility. There has been some debate about the impacts of this linkage on 
corn price and oil price volatility. For example, one group of authors asserts that the energy 
market gives stability to the food market albeit at the cost of higher food prices. They further 
assert that instability in the US agricultural market is transmitted to the energy market 
(Hochman, Sexton & Zilberman 2008). In a later paper studying the volatility spillovers in the 
Brazilian ethanol market, where sugar is the primary ingredient in ethanol, the authors find the 
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opposite. Volatility in the oil market increases volatility in the ethanol market that spills over to 
the sugar market (Serra, Zilberman and Gil 2011). Clearly our understanding of the nature of 
price volatility in price transmission is evolving. 
Understanding the nature of the relationship between the oil, ethanol, and corn markets 
and the direction in which the volatility flow is important. First, an accurate understanding of the 
effects of policy will assist policymakers in crafting targeted, effective policies while minimizing 
social costs and externalities. Second, an understanding the nature of the price risk involved is 
very important. This is especially true for the already volatile, weather-dependent corn market.  
 
2.2 Early Research: Agricultural and Energy Markets are linked 
 
Early studies were able to identify that agricultural commodity prices and oil prices were 
indeed linked. Co-integration analyses determine statistically or econometrically whether two 
different commodities prices move together over time. In other words, if the market for corn and 
gasoline were linked, we would expect their prices to generally increase or decrease at the same 
time.  
Campiche et al. (2007) study the covariability of oil prices, corn, and other agricultural 
commodities in two time periods: 2003-2005 and 2006-2007. Using a vector error correction 
model, the authors find that none of agricultural commodities were co-integrated with oil prices 
from 2003-2005. However, corn and soybeans were co-integrated with oil prices in 2006-2007. 
This indicated that corn and soybeans were somehow linked to the price of oil with biofuels 
suspected to be the link. However, co-integration analyses do not provide a theoretical basis for 
the relationship. Further, they do not specifically identify how the price transmission occurs 
(Ciaian and Kancs 2011). In other words, co-integration analyses can tell us statistically whether 
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two sets of prices are moving together. This approach does not tell us what mathematic or 
economic relationship governs this shared movement.  
Equilibrium models have also been employed to explore the linkage between agriculture 
and energy markets. Through a series of papers, de Gorter and Just (2009a, 2009b) analyze 
multiple policy instruments (tax exemption or tax credits and blending or consumption 
mandates) simultaneously using a partial equilibrium model. Additional equilibrium models that 
examine alternative biofuel policy scenarios include Yano, Blandford, and Surry (2010); 
Thompson, Meyer, and Westhoff (2009); and Hochman, Sexton, and Zilberman (2008). 
 
2.3 The Nature of Storage: An argument for Including it in a Model of Ethanol Policy 
 
The idea that annual fluctuations in supplies of grains and other 
storable agricultural commodities can or should be evened out 
through the medium of the year to year storage is thousands of 
years old. (Gustafson 1958, pg. 1) 
 
Suppose for a moment that storing corn from one period to the next is impossible. 
Without the ability to store corn, the price is determined by the market clearing condition where 
quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. Because corn is an annual crop, once it is planted 
there is no way to supply adjustments. Thus, the market price is almost entirely determined by 
the quantity of the annual harvest. 
However, corn is a storable commodity. In the case of an exceptionally large harvest, 
excess corn could be stored until a later period. When the price falls due to a large harvest, 
increasing the stocks of corn on hand can reduce the severity of the price slump (Wright 2011). 
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On the other hand, consider the case of a poor harvest. Without storage the price of corn would 
rise sharply to meter out the limited supply to those who can pay the increased price. Releasing 
stocks when the supply of corn is low can reduce the high price spike. However, storage can only 
mitigate price spikes as long as there are stocks of corn available (Wright 2011). Furthermore, 
volatility increases as stocks decline (Williams and Wright 1991; Wright 2011).  
Storage can aid in smoothing both negative and positive price spikes. However, when 
stocks reach zero and expected prices are high, supply must equal demand. In the short run, 
supply is fixed. In this case, some uses may go unfilled such as the need for animal feed or 
demand by poor consumers (Wright 2011). Storage cannot mitigate a persistent change in the 
price level, but it can mitigate a price increase caused by a sudden, unforeseen jump in demand 
like that of biofuels.  
A sudden, permanent demand shock, and economists argue that biofuels fall into this 
category, requires the market to adjust (Roberts and Tram 2012). This adjustment must be 
satisfied by a combination of releasing stored inventory and higher prices to meter out the 
limited supply. Market adjustment will begin as soon as the demand shock is anticipated 
(Roberts and Tram 2012). If the initial demand shock and resulting shifting out of demand 
happens unanticipated and there are sufficient inventories to absorb the shock, the initial price 
change will be relatively small (Roberts and Tram 2012).  However, if stocks are drawn down, 
this may contribute to increased price volatility during the transition from old to new 
equilibriums. If the market can anticipate the demand shock and accumulate stocks in advance, 
the actual price shock is pushed backwards in time to the time of anticipation (Roberts and Tram 
2012). 
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While, there is discussion about the linkage between stocks and price at the theoretical 
level, the scarcity of data on public and private stocks has limited the number of empirical 
applications (Serra and Gil 2012). However, there are empirical studies where stocks had a 
signification influence on market price behavior. For example, Kim and Chavas (2002) used 
econometric analysis to show that increasing private and public stocks of U.S. non-fat dry milk 
had significant impacts reducing price volatility. 
Although storage has the ability to smooth out potential price highs and lows, it 
complicates market analysis because market clearing no longer occurs where current 
consumption equals current supply if stocks are changing. Storage can be characterized as inter-
temporal arbitrage (Wright 2011). In other words, storing grain is a bet that prices will be higher 
in the future, and high enough to at least cover the storage costs. Given that ethanol policy is 
accused of contributing to those price highs and lows, consideration of storage is warranted. 
Recently, Wright (2011) asserted storage could mitigate a price increase caused by a mandated 
demand increase such as biofuels policy.  
 
2.4 Competitive Grain Storage Model 
 
The model set forth by Gustafson (1958) was the first rigorous model of the market for a 
storable crop. The model he introduced would later come to be known as the rational 
expectations model. Wright and Williams used this model as the basis for their modeling and 
numerical simulations of grain storage demand and the resulting impact on the market for grains 
using best guesses of key parameters (1982, 1984). 
 In the competitive storage model, understanding the relationship between prices and 
stocks is critical to understanding price volatility. In the basic form of the model, price behavior 
is entirely dependent of supply shocks (Serra and Gil 2012). Some simplifying assumptions are 
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employed. First, the marginal cost of storage is positive but relatively small. It is thus reasonable 
to assume that the unit cost of storage is constant. Furthermore, they assume that storage capacity 
does not constrain the size of stocks (Wright 2011). One important feature of the model and 
interesting point to consider is that storage cannot be negative for the market as a whole. 
Transfers through storage are unidirectional. This means that the market, as a whole, can borrow 
from the past. Corn is transferred through storage from last period to this period. However, the 
market cannot borrow from the future. This would mean stocks would be negative (Wright 
2011). 
This discussion will follow Wright’s work (Williams and Wright 1991, Wright 2011). 
This model assumes an agricultural crop that is storable and experiences planning once per year. 
For ease of understanding, the year the crop is sown will be referred to as 𝑡 − 1  and the year the 
crop is harvested is  𝑡. Likewise, ℎ! represents the harvest in year 𝑡. The distribution of ℎ! is 
known, but the individual draw is random due to weather disturbances. Furthermore, the variable ℎ! cannot be accurately predicted one year in advance (Wright 2011). In other words, you know 
when you plant the crop the range of possible harvest outcomes and the probability that each 
harvest outcome will occur. However, you do not know with certainty exactly which outcome 
will prevail. 
 The market demand for the crop is the horizontal sum of the two demands. The first is the 
consumption demand in period 𝑡, represented by 𝑐!. This is the consumption for the crop in the 
current period. The second is the storage demand, 𝑥!. This is also referred to carry-out. This is 
the amount stored or carried out of the period for sale in a later period. In any period, the sum of 
the current period’s harvest and carry-in, amount stored last period, is the available supply, 𝐴!.  
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Likewise, consumption in the current period represents the difference in available supply, 𝐴!, 
and stocks that are carried out, 𝑥!. This yields two accounting relationships 𝐴! = ℎ! + 𝑥!!! 
 𝑐! = 𝐴! − 𝑥! 
 
The model assumes competitive storage where the amount of stocks carried out, 𝑥!, are positive 
only when the expected increase in the price of the stored grain is greater than or equal the cost 
of storing that grain and the prevailing interest rate. Because market actors are competitive, 
expected profits will fall to zero. This means that firms will enter the market to store grain as 
long as there are positive profits to be made. Those firms will exit when expected profits are 
negative. These concepts form the basis for the competitive storage model. The Wright model 
does not initially consider spatial questions, trade barriers, subsidies or taxes (Wright 2011). 
However, we will begin to address these topics within this work. A more detailed explanation of 
estimating the model can be found in the methodology section. 
Deaton and Laroque pioneered the empirical estimation of the competitive storage model 
(1995). Prior to their work, the limited availability of time series data had prevented its 
estimation (Cafiero et al. 2011). Their results presented a dim view of the storage model and its 
ability to explain the serial correlation of commodity prices. Deaton and Laroque concluded this 
was a failure of the model itself, rather than an error in specification or estimation (1995). 
Recently, this finding has been overturned. Cafiero et al. (2011) recreated the analyses by Deaton 
and Laroque (1995) using their original data set. By improving the estimation technique, Cafiero 
et al. were able to show the competitive storage model was indeed capable of replicating the 
price variation seen in commodity markets (2011). This led the authors to conclude the 
competitive storage model was a useful tool (Cafiero et al 2011).  
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 Another example of implementing the competitive storage model is Roberts and Tran 
(2012) where the transition between the pre-biofuel and post-biofuel economic environments is 
pinpointed. They characterize biofuels as a permanent shift in demand. They seek to understand 
when the market anticipated the biofuel demand shock, relative change in elasticities between the 
new and old economic environment, and inventories assisted during the adjustment period.  
Robert and Tram (2012) include both supply and demand responses in their model. Demand is a 
function of current price. Supply response is modeled as the land area cultivated based on 
expected future price.  
They create simulated data and compute GMM-like scores to obtain the parameters with 
the least difference between the simulated and observed data. The model also converts corn, 
soybeans, rice, and wheat values for production and prices into dollars per calorie. Finally, the 
four commodities are aggregated to form a single series of data. The authors assert prices and 
inventories can both rise because a rational market can foresee continually rising prices. One 
possible scenario is that the market anticipated the biofuel demand shock in 2006-2007. This 
resulted in increased prices and inventories.  
Another way of exploring the effect of expanding ethanol production on corn prices using 
a structural vector autoregression to model the dynamics of corn storage (Carter et al. 2011). The 
authors argue that it is necessary to account for inventories (i.e. storage) when constructing a 
model that explains the price response to the increased demand for ethanol (demand shock). In 
their analysis this comes into play two ways. First, that market actors in the latter part of 2006 
should have been able to foresee the coming boom in ethanol and would have acted on that 
hunch.  Second, the price response to a shock depends on the available inventories.  
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 The model developed by Carter et al. (2011) relies on a two-period model includes 
supply and demand in the first period and second periods with storage between the first and 
second periods. The demand function includes all sources of use. For simplicity, there are no 
imports and the supply in the first period is fixed. Supply in the second period is given by the 
expected price for the good in period 2 at the end of period 1. Storage cannot be negative, but the 
price of storage can be (Carter et al. 2011). 
 Carter et al. (2012) uses a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) to estimate curves for 
supply of inventory, demand for inventory, and supply of storage. The estimated parameters are 
based upon annual data from 1961-2005. Then, those parameters are used to conduct a 
counterfactual analysis by forecasting annual prices and inventory for 2006-2010 without supply 
and demand shocks such as the ethanol boom. The authors estimate that corn price would have 
been 30 percent lower during the 2006-2010 span if the ethanol boom had not occurred (Carter et 
al. 2011). Storage comes into play in the analysis as one of the regression variables, log crop-
year ending inventories, using the US corn inventory on August 31 of each year. The authors 
conclude that ethanol prices had indeed increased in advance of the new RFS going into effect, 
corn prices would have been 30 percent lower without the ethanol boom, 2010 corn inventory 
was run down because of poor harvest, and 2010 prices were 50 percent above where they would 
have been if ethanol production had been fixed at 2005 levels.  
 
2.5 Linking the Corn, Ethanol, and Gasoline Prices through Ethanol Policy 
 
We will consider a competitive market to determine the linkages between corn, ethanol 
and gasoline prices. The development of these linkages is necessary for extending the 
competitive storage model to include ethanol policy. First, we will explore the link between corn 
and ethanol. We will then proceed to derive the relationship between corn, ethanol, and oil prices 
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in the presence of a mandate and tax credit. This discussion will substantially follow the work of 
de Gorter and Just (2008; 2010). 
Let us now consider the relationship between corn and ethanol. Corn is an input in the 
manufacture of ethanol. One bushel of corn can make 2.8 gallons of ethanol (Eidman 2007). 
Ethanol is not the only product made from corn in the process. When corn is used to manufacture 
ethanol, a co-product, dried distillers grain with solubles (DDGS), is produced. This co-product 
is far from useless. In fact, the DDGS is substitutable for corn in non-ethanol uses such as animal 
feed (Drabik, 2011). Thus, DDGS will replace corn in non-ethanol uses like animal feed. This, in 
turn, frees up more corn for use in the making of ethanol (Drabik, 2011).  
Let β represent the gallons of gasoline produced from a bushel of corn and δ is the 
proportion of the value of the corn products returned to the market as byproducts of ethanol. 
Then the price of corn can be written as 
PEb=
β
1-δ
PG+tC -co   
where PEb is given by the price of corn being equal to the price of ethanol in $/bushel. Following 
de Gorter and Just, we adopt values from existing literature. Values for β and δ are 2.8 and .31 
respectively (Eidman 2007). Inserting these values into the equation we find that (𝛽  /1− 𝛿  ) is 
equal to 4 making the corn price very sensitive to a change in ethanol’s price by changes in 
policy or oil price (de Gorter and Just 2008). The price relationship between corn and ethanol 
rests on the assumption that ethanol producers operate under the zero profit condition (Drabik 
2011).  
 Most researchers have argued that consumers are unaware or do not adjust their 
purchases based on the reduced mileage provided by ethanol. Recall that ethanol is less efficient 
than gasoline and provides fewer miles per gallon that gasoline. However, the increase in flexible 
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fuel vehicles and fuel stations offering E-85 means consumers could be adjusting their purchases 
based on the mileage each fuel, ethanol or gasoline, provided (de Gorter and Just 2008).  
According to the U.S. Department of Energy Alternative Fuels & Advanced Vehicles Data 
Center, E-85 is available at over 2,400 locations in 40 states across the country providing an 
estimated 8 million flexible fuel vehicles. The U.S. Department of Energy website also features 
an Alternative Fueling Station Locator (“Alternative Fueling”). The Renewable Fuels 
Association (RFA) also has a Flex-Fuel Station Locator application, or “app”, for iPhone and 
Android Platforms. In addition, the RFA also provides a downloadable list of E-85 stations for 
users of GPS units like TomTom and Garmin (“There’s an iPhone App”). It is reasonable to 
assume that at least some consumers are already allocating their fuel purchases based on the 
mileage ethanol and gasoline provide.  
On the other end of the spectrum, there are gas stations selling gasoline that contains no 
ethanol.  Because the ethanol consumption mandate is enforced at the aggregate market level, the 
minimum amount of ethanol consumption may be met without every gallon of fuel containing 
ethanol. Thus, there is flexibility for consumers to choose the gasoline/ethanol blend based on 
the contribution of each to mileage.  
Following de Gorter and Just (2008), we can derive the “flex model” market price of 
ethanol where consumers adjust for ethanol’s contribution to mileage. Thus, the price consumers 
are willing to pay for an ethanol blend, 𝑃!  , is represented by: 𝑃! = 𝜆(𝑃! + 𝑡) 
 
where  
 
 𝜆 = .70 = 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑠  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑛  𝑜𝑓  𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 
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(de Gorter and Just 2008). This represents the amount consumers are willing to pay for ethanol 
given that it yields .7 times as many miles as the same amount of gasoline. The revenue refiner’s 
receive from the sale of ethanol is 𝑃! + 𝑡 − 𝑡! 
 
Setting the two equations equal 
 𝑃! − 𝜆 𝑃! + 𝑡 = 𝑃! + 𝑡 − 𝑡! 
 
solving for 𝑃! gives a market price for ethanol of: 
 𝑃! = 𝜆𝑃! − 1− 𝜆 𝑡 + 𝑡! 
 
 In contrast to de Gorter and Just, Mallory et al. identify the linkage between the corn and 
ethanol market in the prices of corn futures more than one year to maturity. Motivated by an 
apparent disconnect between economic theory and the literature and in agreement with de Gorter 
and Just (2008), the authors maintain that the no-profit condition is appropriate. However, the 
authors disagree that the relationship is determined in current spot prices in favor of prices in the 
futures market.  
 The authors argue that the ethanol industry is large enough to be considered competitive. 
The assumption of competitiveness means that the condition of no profits in the long run holds. 
If there are positive profits to be made by high prices, firms will enter the market and/or expand 
ethanol production to force the price down. Likewise, if prices are low, production will contract. 
The zero-profit condition does not hold in the short run because expansion of production requires 
a time horizon. Because the break-even condition occurs in the long run, the relationship 
between corn and ethanol prices should also occur beyond the short run. The authors derive the 
long run zero profit condition based on total revenue equaling total cost. In testing the validity of 
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their formulation of the link, they find that from mid-2006 until 2010 the linkage was so strong it 
appeared to dominate all other market forces. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Overview 
The goal is to calibrate a partial equilibrium model of the corn, ethanol and fuel market to 
determine the effects of biofuel policies on the characteristics of the storage curve and stock 
levels. The biofuel policies under consideration are the ethanol consumption mandate and the 
blenders tax credit.  
Like Wright’s model, the competitive storage model estimated here includes the effects 
of uncertainty in corn production (2011). However, the model is extended to include uncertainty 
in gasoline prices. Wright’s model is further extended to consider the price linkages between 
corn, ethanol and oil markets (2011). 
Wright’s competitive storage model solves for grain storers’ expected corn price that 
result in a particular amount of corn stocks carried in to the period. Wright’s model is based on 
the assumption that errors in corn yields are uncorrelated from one period to the next, and hence 
storage of corn is the only link between corn prices from one period to the next. Hence, the 
expected equilibrium price at the time of planting is a function of the amount of grain stored that 
will be available at the time of harvest. This relationship between expected price and storage will 
be used in the stylized model of the US market for corn to produce corn supply, demand, and 
storage demand curves.  
 
3.2 Modeling Biofuel Policies with Competitive Storage  
 The competitive storage model is too complicated to be solved analytically. Following 
Williams and Wright (1991), the model is estimated using a polynomial approximation. Their 
analysis finds a low-order (quadratic) polynomial to be a good estimation technique. Polynomial 
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approximations are useful for quickly estimating an otherwise difficult function to estimate. A 
brief overview of the polynomial approximation routine used to solve the competitive storage 
model is now given.  
Suppose in each period 𝑡 we want to determine how much grain to store, 𝑆!. We can call 
future storage, storage next period, 𝑆!!!. Suppose that storage in period 𝑡 + 1  follows a 
relationship, 𝜓 𝑆!!! , the expected price of corn for period 𝑡 + 2. In other words, market actors 
will select the amount of corn to store next period based on what they expect prices to be the 
following period when they will sell the corn. This function implies a relationship between 
expected prices and current storage. Now suppose that the potential amounts of storage in the 
current period 𝑆! is represented by a set of integer values. Given any value 𝑆! we can calculate 
the expected price in the following period 𝑡 + 1 given that storage decisions in that period 
follows 𝜓(𝑆), and supposing that the market equilibrium prevails in period 𝑡 + 1. Using the 
relationship between the average price in period 𝑡 + 1 and the amount stored in the current 
period, time period 𝑡, we find the solution to our system when 𝜓(𝑆) produces expected prices in 
period 𝑡 + 1 that are equal to 𝜓(𝑆).  
 The computer program is given a starting value for the function 𝜓(𝑆) to calculate the 
average price in period 𝑡 + 1, using expected storage in 𝑡 + 1, expected price, and storage in 
period 𝑡, 𝑆!!!, 𝜓, and 𝑆! respectively. Then revised or more accurate starting value of 𝜓 is 
generated by using the specified relationship between the average price in period 𝑡 + 1 and the 
storage in period 𝑡. The program iterates to revise the function 𝜓  until 𝜓 approximately 
reproduces itself. My modification to this competitive storage model is that in solving for the 
equilibrium price in period 𝑡 + 1, the supply, demand and policy functions introduced by de 
Gorter and Just (2009) are used to simulate the effects of ethanol policy.  
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3.3 Solving the Model  
My version of the competitive storage model is estimated by MATLAB as a constrained 
minimization problem. What follows is a detailed description of the computer routine used to 
solve the model. This discussion follows the framework of the polynomial approximation 
technique outlined by Williams and Wright (1991). A discussion of how the model was 
augmented to include ethanol policy is included with each step.  This discussion mirrors that 
found on pages 83 through 85 of their book, but highlighting how the model of biofuels markets 
are superimposed on the competitive storage model. 
To begin, we specify a stochastic constant elasticity supply for corn, 
(1) 𝑄!!!! = 𝐶! ∙ 𝐸! 𝑃!!!! !!𝜖!!!  !  
where 𝑄!!!!  is the quantity supplied of corn in period 𝑡 + 1, 𝐸! 𝑃!!!!  is the expected price of 
corn in period 𝑡 + 1  at the period 𝑡, 𝜂!is the supply elasticity, and 𝐶! is a constant. The 
multiplicative disturbance term 𝜖!!!!  is assumed to be distributed such that ln 𝜖!! ~𝑁 1−
!!! ,𝜎! , thus 𝐸 𝜖!! = 1. Additionally, we specify a constant elasticity demand for non-ethanol 
corn,  
(2)  𝑄!!!! = 𝐶! ∙ 𝑃!!!! !! 
where variables are defined as in the supply curve. The price of pure gasoline (with no ethanol) 
is assumed to be exogenous, but stochastic, and given by 𝑃!!!! = 𝑃!𝜖!!!! . Here,  𝑃!   is the price 
level, and the disturbance term is distributed with ln 𝜖!! ~𝑁 1− !!! , 𝑣! .  A constant elasticity 
demand for blended fuel is given by 
(3) 𝑄!!!! = 𝐶! ∙ 𝑃!!!! !! 
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where 𝑄!!!!  is the quantity of blended fuel, 𝐶! is a multiplicative constant, 𝑃!!!!  is the price of 
fuel in time period 𝑡 + 1, and 𝜂! is the elasticity of fuel demand. Here, the price of fuel is 
determined as  
(4) 𝑃!!!! = 𝛼 𝑃!!!! + 𝜏 − 𝜏! + (1− 𝛼)(𝑃!!!! + 𝜏) 
where 𝑝!!!!  is the price of ethanol per gallon, 𝜏 is the per gallon tax on fuel, 𝜏! is the per gallon 
tax credit for blending ethanol, and 𝛼 is the proportion of ethanol in the fuel blend. Equation (4) 
requires that the price of fuel be equal to the marginal cost of the inputs. Additionally, there is 
some relationship, 𝜓(𝑆!) ≡ 𝐸! 𝑃!!!! |𝑆! , that yields the expected price as a function of storage 
carried in. The inverse of this function, 𝜓!! 𝐸! 𝑃!!!!  yields the storage carry in implied by a 
particular expected price.  The amount of available corn in any period is thus determined by the 
prior expected price 𝐸! 𝑃!!!! , which determines both planned production and storage carry-in, 
and the disturbance term for production, 𝜖!!!  ! . The realized price is determined in one of three 
ways.   
 (i) If no ethanol is produced, then the realized price of corn is determined where 𝑄! 𝐸! 𝑃!!!! + 𝜓!! 𝐸! 𝑃!!!! = 𝑄! 𝑃!!!! + 𝜓!! 𝐸!!! 𝑃!!!!  
We will refer to the solution to this system as 𝑃!!!!" . This is equivalent to the standard model of 
storage described by Williams and Wright (1991). 
(ii) If ethanol is produced and there is either no blend mandate or the blend mandate is not 
binding, then the price of corn is determined indirectly by the price of gasoline. If consumers 
purchase both ethanol and gasoline, they must be indifferent between both fuels—meaning their 
price per mile is identical. This means 𝑝!!!! + 𝜏 − 𝜏! = 𝜆(𝑃!!!! + 𝜏) 
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where 𝜆 is the ratio of miles per gallon from ethanol to miles per gallon from gasoline.  The left 
hand side represents what consumers pay for a gallon of ethanol, while the right hand side is 
what consumers pay for a gallon of gasoline. This relationship implies that  𝑝!!!! = 𝜆𝑃!!!! + 𝜆 − 1 𝜏 + 𝜏! 
The corn price is then determined by the zero profit condition for producing ethanol, equating the 
cost of corn inputs and conversion to ethanol and the revenue from sales. This can be written as 𝑝!!!! + 𝑐! = 𝛽𝑝!!!! + 𝑝!!!! 𝛿 
where 𝑐! is the cost of converting a bushel of corn to ethanol, 𝛽 is the number of gallons of 
ethanol yielded from one bushel of corn, and 𝛿 is the proportion of a bushel of corn that is 
returned to the corn market as byproduct. This results in the corn price  
𝑝!!!! = 𝛽1− 𝛿 𝑝!!!! − 𝑐! 
where 𝑐! is the non-corn price of producing a gallon of ethanol.  We will refer to this price as 𝑃!!!!". 
(iii) If a mandate is binding, then the corn price is determined jointly by the price of blended fuel 
and the amount of corn needed to meet the mandate. Define the supply of ethanol as 
𝑆! 𝑃!!!! ≡ 𝛽1− 𝛿 𝑄!!!! 𝑃!!!! + 𝑆! − 𝑄!!!! 𝑃!!!! − 𝜓!! 𝐸! 𝑃!!!!  
Then, the price of corn is determined by equating the supply and demand for fuel 𝑆! 𝑃!!!! = 𝛼𝑄!!!! 𝛼 𝑃!!!! + 𝜏 − 𝜏! + 1− 𝛼 𝑃!!!! + 𝜏  
 where 𝛼 is the required percentage blend of ethanol. We will refer to this price as 𝑃!!!!"#. 
The prevailing corn price that clears all markets is determined by 𝑃!!!! = max 𝑃!!!!" ,𝑃!!!!" ,𝑃!!!!"# . 
The simulation program contains several embedded loops to determine the equilibrium values for 
quantities and prices given a specific starting value for 𝜓 𝑆 . The possible values of storage, 𝑆 
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are specified as a vector of integers. In each iteration, the expected price given each possible 
value of 𝑆 is calculated and the sum of squared errors are calculated as 𝜓 𝑆! − 𝐸 𝑃! 𝑆! !!! . 
The process is repeated until the values of 𝜓 𝑆  that represent the minimum sum of squared 
errors are found. This minimum is found using the MatLab command fmincon. This command 
solves for a constrained minimum of a function of several variables using a starting value. We 
specify 𝜓 𝑆  as a third order polynomial, with starting values for the constant term given by the 
prevailing expected market price without storage, and other values as zero. We constrain the 
function to be positive and decreasing over the possible storage amounts.  The algorithm 
proceeds as follows (see Williams and Wright, 1991): 
1. For each possible storage value 𝑆!,  an initial value of the corresponding planned 
production level ℎ!!!!  is made. We will refer to this starting value as 𝜒. 
A. Using the distribution of 𝜖!, create a discrete vector of possible values for 𝜖!,  which values we will refer to as 𝜖!!. Create a corresponding discrete 
probability density with values 𝑣! such that 𝑣! = Pr  (𝜖!!!! < 𝜖 < 𝜖!!). 
Multiply 𝜒 by 1+ 𝜖!!  to create the vector of realized values of production 
next period. 
B. Add 𝑆! to each realized value of production generated in step (A) to produce a 
vector 𝐴!!!!  of the available corn in the next period. 
i. Begin a loop over each possible 𝐴!!!!"  in 𝐴!!!! . 
a. For each 𝐴!!!!"  , numerically solve 𝑃! 𝐴!!!!"   − 𝑆!!!!" + 𝑘 −
! !!!!!"!!! = 0. This is the arbitrage condition for grain stored. 
Here, 𝑃!  is calculated according to the ethanol price model 
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described previously. Additionally, the expected corn price is 
calculated over the possible values of the gasoline price. 
ii.  For each pair,   𝐴!!!!" , 𝑆!!!!"  that solve the arbitrage equation, calculate the associated price 𝑃! 𝑄! = 𝑃! 𝐴!!!!"   − 𝑆!!!!"  from the equilibrium conditions given previously. Again, this will 
be the price expectation of the uncertain gasoline price. 
C.  Using the vector of these prices, calculate the expected price 𝐸! 𝑃!!! 𝑆!! = 𝑃! 𝐴!!!!"   − 𝑆!!!!" 𝑣!!  
This yields the expected price in period 𝑡 given the amount of carryout from 𝑡 is 𝑆! and that 
storage in period 𝑡 + 1   is determined by 𝜓. 
D.  Calculate 𝑃!!!! |𝑆!!, the rational expectations price to producers. 𝑃!!!! |𝑆!! = 1+ 𝜖!! 𝑃! 𝐴!!!!"   − 𝑆!!!!" 𝑣!!  
E. Substitute 𝑃!!!! |𝑆!! in the function for planned production, ℎ!!! = ℎ 𝑃!!!! , and find the 
difference  𝛥 = ℎ!!! − 𝜒 . If 𝛥 is too large, choose a lower guess and repeat steps A through E. 
Otherwise 𝜒 is considered to be consistent and the algorithm proceeds. 
2. When A through E have been completed for each element of 𝑆!, fit the values of 𝐸! 𝑃!!! 𝑆!! , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁 using ordinary least squares assuming a third order polynomial, calling the resulting 
parameters  𝜓. 
3. If the fitted values of the regression a close enough (using a sum of squared error loss 
function) then these represent the solution. Otherwise, use 𝜓 as the new starting values and begin 
at step 1 again. 
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Once we have obtained the coefficients of the third-order polynomial 𝜓, we use those values in a 
numerical solver, Microsoft Excel, along with the supply and demand parameters to map corn 
supply, corn demand and the curve for storage. 
 
3.4 Data and Model Calibration 
Data and parameters for calibrating the 2005-2006 and 2010-2011 crop year simulations 
came from multiple sources. Table 1 summarizes the parameters used to calibrate the 
simulations. Data for corn supply, non-ethanol demand, and observed corn price were taken from 
the USDA World Agriculture Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE) reports for the 
appropriate years. The value for ethanol use was subtracted from total corn usage to obtain total 
non-ethanol use of corn. Corn supply and demand is given by millions of bushels and corn price 
is given in dollars per bushel. In the 2005-2006 crop year, there was a loan payment of $.39 per 
bushel (USDA). Corn supply and demand elasticities adopted were .2 and   −.2 respectively. 
These values were used taken from existing literature (de Gorter & Just 2009b).   
 Fuel supply and demand data was obtained from the US Energy Information 
Administration in the form of gasoline supplied. Fuel data was given in thousands of barrels per 
year. This was converted to gallons using the conversion 1  𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 = 42  𝑔𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑠 (US EIA). 
Finally, it was converted to millions of gallons of finished motor gasoline per year. Because the   
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Table 1. Values to Calibrate Model Economy
  
Paramater Name 2005-06 2010-2011 Unit
Corn Supply Elasticity 0.2 0.2
Observed Price of Corn 2 5.18 $/bushel
Price of corn 2.39 5.18 $/bushel
Ratio of mpg ethanol to mpg gasoline 0.7 0.7 ratio
Observed Price of Gas (less taxes) 2.205 2.875 $/gallon
Blend Mandate 0 0.09232
ethanol to corn price conversion (Chsi) 4 4
Corn Supply Constant 11114 12447 Millions of Bushels
Corn Demand Elasticity 0.2 0.2
Corn Demand Constant 9667 8034 Millions of Bushels
Fuel Demand Elasticity 0.2 0.2
Fuel Demand Constant 141365 135235 Millions of Gallons
Interest rate 0.0325 0.0325
Cost to store a bushel of corn 1 period 0.34 0.34 $/bushel
CV of Corn Supply 0.09475 0.09475
CV of gasoline price 0.0313 0.0313
Fuel Tax 0.495 0.495 $/gallon
Ethanol Tax Credit 0.52 0.52 $/gallon
Cost of Inputs other than corn to manufacture ethanol 0.6 0.6 $/gallon
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gasoline data was based on a calendar year, the weighted average of the two years making up the 
crop year was used. The weights represented the portion of the calendar year covered by the crop 
year.  
 Gasoline price was also obtained from the US Energy Information Administration in 
dollars per gallon. The gasoline prices obtained were monthly average US city gasoline prices 
including taxes for all types of gasoline. The average value for the months making up the 
respective crop years was calculated and used as the observed gasoline price to calibrate the 
model. The value of gasoline demand elasticity, −.2, was taken from existing literature (de 
Gorter and Just 2009b).  
 The blend mandate for ethanol was determined by dividing total ethanol consumed by 
total fuel consumed. For the interest rate, data was taken from historic Federal Reserve Bank 
Prime Rate for the respective crop year. The prime rate is the rate which banks base many loan 
rates on. The monthly values were averaged for the months contained in the crop year. The cost 
of storage is given by the cost to store one bushel of corn one period.  
 Data was also obtained to determine the variance in the corn supply (USDA NASS). 
Annual production in bushels for 2000-2011 was used to calculate the coefficient of variation for 
corn harvest and obtain a value of .09475. That value was doubled to achieve a high level of corn 
supply variation for the sensitivity analysis. To determine the variation in gasoline price, 
monthly average gas prices for all types of gasoline were obtained from the US Energy 
Information Administration in dollars per gallon including taxes. The annual coefficient of 
variation (CV) was calculated from 2000-2011. The CV’s ranged from a low value of .0313 in 
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2010 to a high value of .2203 in 2008. These values were transformed to construct a log-normal 
distribution with a mean and standard deviation representative of the observed data. Moreover, 
we limited storage to be between 0 and 3 million bushels.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
 
4.1 Effect of Ethanol Policy on Storage: Comparing Pre and Post Biofuel Equilibria 
 The 2005-2006 crop year was chosen as a pre-biofuel scenario because it was before the 
RFS took effect (and thus prior to the blend mandate). This will serve as a baseline to evaluate 
how ethanol policy has altered the storage curve by either shifting it outward/upward or changing 
its slope.  
The storage curve represents additional demand, in the form of storage, at each price of 
corn. Storage represents market actors’ expectations about future prices. If prices are expected to 
be higher and high enough to cover the cost of storage, represented by the interest rate and price 
to store gain, positive amounts of grain will be stored. If expected prices indicate it does not pay 
to store grain, storage will be zero. Positive storage indicates a belief that prices have some 
probability of being higher in the future. We expect the addition of biofuel policies to shift the 
storage curve rightward. This rightward shift represents an increase in storage at every price and 
an expectation by market actors that prices will be higher in the future. This increase could be 
because actors believe the corn prices will increase due to the mandate, or because actors believe 
that rising gasoline prices will increasing corn prices. If gasoline prices are increasing, 
consumers will have incentive to substitute ethanol for gasoline. Thus, market actors could 
rationally expect more ethanol, hence more corn, to be consumed next period raising the price of 
corn. 
Figure 3 graphs corn supply, corn demand, and storage using the results of the simulation 
for 2005-06 with an excise tax credit, the policy in place during that period. The graph includes a 
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downward sloping non-ethanol demand curve for corn and an upward sloping supply of corn. 
There is also a line representing the expected price of gasoline in dollars per bushel. This price of 
gasoline is achieved by multiplying the ethanol price conversion factor, 𝜉, by the gasoline price. 
In this case, the market would begin to store corn when the price of corn drops below the 
expected price of gasoline converted to bushels. More grain would be stored at lower prices 
because the price of corn is expected to increase more severely.  
There was no appreciable difference in the results between different policy states using 
the 2005-06 crop year. This can be interpreted to mean very little ethanol was produced or would 
have been produced in 2005-06. In fact, the market could bear so little ethanol that differing 
biofuel policies had little effect on the amount of corn that would have been stored. 
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Figure 3. Storage for the 2005-06 crop year with an excise tax credit 
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The 2010-2011 crop year was chosen to represent a post-biofuel demand shock state 
where a transition to a new equilibrium has taken place. Figure 4 represents the 2010-11 crop 
year simulated with a mandate and tax credit in place. Notice the price of gasoline in bushels is 
lower than in Figure 3. In the 2005-06 crop year, ethanol was only being used for its additive 
value so less than one percent of fuel was ethanol. Thus the cost of ethanol was omitted form this 
calculation. In the 2010-2011 crop year, substantially more ethanol was consumed.  
Therefore, ethanol’s contribution to fuel mileage was considered in the calculation for the 
gasoline price in bushels. This effectively lowered the gasoline price in $/bushel as seen by the 
corn market. 
After simulating the policies in place during the 2005-06 and 2010-11 crop year, the 
amounts of grain stored versus price are plotted against one another. The result is contained in 
Figure 5. At every price, more corn is stored in 2010-2011 than in the pre-biofuel crop year of 
2005-06. The increase in storage is similar at every price. 
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Figure 4: Storage in the 2010-11 Crop Year with a Mandate and Tax Credit 
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Figure 5: Corn Stored Before and After Biofuels 
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4.2 Simulating Biofuel Policy States: No Policy 
The simulation allows us to consider four alternative policy states: no policy, a 
consumption mandate only, a tax credit only, and a mandate with a tax credit. Simulating these 
four policy states allows us to consider how each policy and combination of policies changes the 
storage curve.  
First, the model was simulated with no mandate and no tax credit—the  no policy state. 
Then, a case for a mandate only was simulated. The results can be seen in Figure 6. The addition 
of a blend mandate causes more corn to be stored at every price. This makes sense if the mandate 
causes more ethanol to be produced than otherwise would have. Likewise, the mandate sends a 
signal to market actors that even more ethanol may be produced next period. This increases 
expected price and increases storage at every price.  
The addition of the mandate increases the equilibrium price of corn, where the storage 
curve intersects the supply curve. However, this equilibrium remains below that expected based 
on the price of gasoline in $/bushel. As the price of corn drops, more corn is stored in 
anticipation of higher prices under a blend mandate.  
The addition of a mandate does not increase storage by the same amount at every price. 
Figure 7 illustrates the amount of corn stored versus price of corn for these two policy states. At 
high prices, very little extra corn is stored with the addition of the mandate. According to this 
graph, as the price approaches zero, there is less difference in the amount of corn stored between 
the two policy states. This could be due to the fact that estimates are less accurate as they 
approach the specified upper and lower bounds for storage. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of No Policy and Mandate Scenarios in the 2010-11 Crop Year 
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Figure 7: Comparison of Storage Under No Policy and Mandate Scenarios
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Adding an excise tax credit to the ethanol consumption mandate should move the storage 
curve rightward. The addition of the tax credit should signal to the market that more ethanol, thus 
more corn, will be consumed next period. Figure 4 illustrates the case where there is both a blend 
mandate and tax credit in place. The price of gasoline per bushel is higher here by nearly two 
dollars with the tax credit. This represents the amount of the tax credit, $.52, multiplied by 𝜉. 
Figure 8 compares the storage curve under a mandate and mandate/tax credit scenario. This 
rightward shift represents increased storage at every price by approximately the same amount. 
Because the tax credit is on a per gallon of ethanol basis, the shift is equivalent across the range 
of prices.   
Next, let us compare the bushels of corn stored with a mandate and mandate/tax credit. 
From our previous analyses, we would expect the addition of the tax credit to the mandate would 
increase storage at every price. Figure 10 illustrates that this is indeed true. At every price, more 
corn is stored with a blend mandate and tax credit than with a tax credit alone. 
 At high prices, less additional corn is stored than along the rest of the curve. This is likely 
due to the fact that the price is nearly to the maximum expected by market actors. Thus, the 
market does not expect the price to increase much more, or at least not enough to cover the costs 
of storage at these higher prices.   
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Figure 8. Comparison of  Mandate and Mandate/Tax Credit Scenarios in the 2010-11 Crop Year 
  
$0.00
$2.00
$4.00
$6.00
$8.00
$10.00
$12.00
$14.00
5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000
Millions	  of	  Bushels
D
o
ll
a
rs
	  p
e
r	  
B
u
sh
e
l
Corn	  Supplied
Non-­‐Ethanol
Corn	  Demand
Storage	  with
Mandate
Gas	  Price	  in
Bushels
Mandate	  and
Tax	  Credit
 45 
  
 
 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of Storage under Mandate and Mandate/Tax Credit Scenario 
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Finally, the model was simulated with only an ethanol tax credit. Although the excise tax 
credit is no longer in place, it is still a useful simulation to run. Notice that with the tax credit and 
the given economic parameters. The intercept of the storage and corn supply curve is above the 
expected gasoline price in bushels.  
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Figure 10: Grain Storage with a Tax Credit Only 
 
 
 
 
  
$0.00	  
$2.00	  
$4.00	  
$6.00	  
$8.00	  
$10.00	  
$12.00	  
$14.00	  
5000	   10000	   15000	   20000	  
D
ol
la
rs
	  p
er
	  B
us
he
l	  
Millions	  of	  Bushels	  
Corn	  
Supplied	  
Non-­‐
Ethanol	  
Corn	  
Demand	  
Storage	  
Price	  of	  Gas	  
in	  Bushels	  
 48 
4.3 Summary 
Four possible policy scenarios were analyzed using a version of the competitive storage 
model extended to account for price relationships created by corn ethanol policy. These results 
are consistent with the heuristic analysis undertaken by Wright (2011). His static analysis 
predicts that biofuels represent an upward shift of the storage curve so that more grain is stored 
at a given price. Similarly, the current analysis shows that corn ethanol policies have shifted the 
storage curve out such that more corn is stored at each price. This outward shift indicates market 
actors expect prices to be higher next period due to the particular biofuel policies in place. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 There is an abundance of information regarding the effect of biofuel policies on price 
levels, price volatility and price linkages between corn, ethanol and gasoline markets. The 
existing literature on the effects of biofuel policy on prices and welfare has largely overlooked 
the effects of storage in their analyses. Because storage has the potential to mitigate price shocks 
through changing levels of inventory, it warrants consideration. The competitive storage model 
represented the first comprehensive understanding of the ability of storage to smooth out prices 
(Wright 2011). The model has been empirically tested and forms the basis for the current 
analysis. The competitive storage model of Wright (2011) has been extended in this thesis to 
include the effects of ethanol policy on corn storage and corn price level. In the process, we have 
specified relatively new linkages between the corn, ethanol, and gasoline prices. Further, the 
competitive storage model, which accounts for variation in corn harvest, has been extended to 
account for variation in the gasoline price to model those new linkages. This analysis takes into 
account the effects of a U.S. ethanol consumption mandate and ethanol tax credit on the corn 
market.  
 First, the simulation was calibrated for the 2005-2006 crop year to provide a baseline for 
the pre-biofuel era. Then, the simulation was repeated using parameters for the 2010-2011 crop 
year. Four policy scenarios were considered: no policy, a consumption mandate only, a tax credit 
only, and finally a mandate and tax credit. In terms of the production of ethanol, there are three 
possible outcomes. First, there could be no ethanol produced where there is no mandate and the 
price of gasoline is lower than the intercept of the ethanol supply curve, with or without a tax 
credit. Second, there could be a consumption mandate that binds to force the production of 
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ethanol in a certain amount. Finally, there could be ethanol production in excess of a binding 
mandate such that price of ethanol is determined by gasoline prices.  
 The results show that biofuel policy causes more grain to be stored. Increased grain 
storage indicates an expectation that prices will be higher in the next period. This makes sense 
because ethanol policies have the potential to cause more ethanol to be produced than otherwise 
would have been the case. An increase in the production of ethanol means an increased demand 
for corn. This analysis has confirmed previous analysis that biofuel policy shifts the storage 
curve outward (Wright 2011). We have shown that a mandate increases the amount of grain 
stored over a no policy scenario. Furthermore, the addition of a tax credit to a mandate causes a 
rightward shift in the storage curve.  
 Future research could utilize this framework to more precisely analyze the welfare 
impacts of U.S. ethanol policy. Because storage has the potential to mitigate price volatility, 
failing to consider storage in welfare analysis could misstate the effects. Likewise, a sensitivity 
analysis could be conducted to determined how responsive storage is to changes in the expected 
volatility of corn supply and gasoline price. The use of the competitive storage model, and its 
consideration of variation in supply, is particularly timely given the current drought conditions 
across the country. Drought conditions will represent a negative supply shock that could increase 
prices. Likewise, the current analysis could be extended to any number of other countries or 
storable commodities. Furthermore, the competitive storage model could be estimated using 
more sophisticated econometric techniques.  
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CHAPTER 7 
APPENDIX 
 
runone.m 
 
clear all 
psi0=5.06; 
psi1=-0.0000000; 
psi2=0000000116907; 
psi3=-0.0000000001746; 
  
psi=[psi0; psi1; psi2; psi3]; 
diary 'on'; 
s=(0:500:3000)'; 
ss=[-ones(size(s)) -s -s.^2 -s.^3]; 
ss2=[zeros(size(s)) ones(size(s)) 2*s 3*s.^2]; 
b=zeros(2*size(s,1),1); 
A=[ss;ss2]; 
hbari=[13586 13586 13586 13586 13586 13586 13586 13586 13586 13586 13586] ; 
save ('hbari', 'hbari'); 
h=fmincon('BlendMandateWithStorageapp',psi,A,b); 
 
blendmandatewithstorageapp.m 
 
function out=BlendMandateWithStorage(psi); 
Ecornsupply=.2; % corn supply elasticity 
pcorn=5.18; 
lambda=.7 %miles using a gallon of ethanol/miles using a gallon of fuel 
pgas=3.37-.495; %exogenous mean gasoline price w/o 49.5 cent tax 
alpha=0;%0.09232; % mandated blend of ethanol 
chsi=4; %gallon ethanol to corn price conversion 
Ccornsupply=12447/pcorn^Ecornsupply;  %multiplicative constant for corn 
supply 
Ecorndemand=-.20;%corn demand elasticity 
Ccorndemand=8034/pcorn^Ecorndemand; % multiplicative constant for non-ethanol 
corn demand 
Efueldemand=-.2;  %fuel demand elasticity 
r=0.0325; %interest rate 
k=0.34; %cost per bushel of storage for one period (34-58) 
sigmac=.09475*1.0 % variance of corn supply 
muc=((-log((sigmac^2)+1))/2) 
sigmasqc=log((sigmac^2)+1) 
sigmag=.0313 % variance of gasoline prices 
mug=((-log((sigmag^2)+1))/2) 
sigmasqg=log((sigmag^2)+1) 
lb=0;%lowest possible storage 
ub=3000;%largest possible storage 
tax=.495 %tax credit 
taxcredit=.52 %ethanol tax credit including federal and state 
costeth=.6 %cost to produce ethanol other than corn 
  
Cfueldemand=135235/(((1-.09232)*(pgas+.495)+(.09232*(pcorn/chsi+.495-
.52+.60))))^Efueldemand; %multiplicative constant for fuel demand 
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%%%%Initial guess for 3rd order polynomial expectation of price of corn next 
period given storage this period 
psi0=psi(1); 
psi1=psi(2); 
psi2=psi(3); 
psi3=psi(4); 
  
%Uncertainty about production 
    v=.1:.1:3; 
    lv=log(v)./sigmac; 
    lgp=log(v)./sigmag; 
    probv=normpdf(lv,muc,sigmasqc)./sum(normpdf(lv,muc,sigmasqc)); 
    probgp=normpdf(lgp,mug,sigmasqg)./sum(normpdf(lgp,mug,sigmasqg)); 
%First loop 
  
i=1; 
Ept=psi0; 
load hbari 
  
for sit=lb:500:ub 
hbar(i)=hbari(i); 
    %%calculating expected price 
    %%%guess at planned production 
        diff2=9999999; 
    while diff2>100 
        probprod=hbar(i).*(v); 
        A(i,:)=probprod+sit*(ones(size(v))); 
        for j=1:length(probprod); 
            %%solve for current equilibrium price 
            si(i,j)=fminbnd('findsi',lb,ub,[],pgas, Ccorndemand, Ecorndemand, 
Cfueldemand, Efueldemand, A(i,j), alpha, chsi, r, psi0, psi1, psi2, psi3,k, 
v, probgp, lambda, tax, taxcredit, costeth); 
            Ecornp(i,j)=eqprice(pgas, Ccorndemand, Ecorndemand, Cfueldemand, 
Efueldemand, A(i,j), si(i,j), alpha, chsi,v, probgp, lambda, tax, taxcredit, 
costeth); 
        end 
        Ecornpgs(i)=Ecornp(i,:)*probv';  %step 7 
        Iprice(i)=Ecornp(i,:).*(ones(size(v)))*probv'; 
        hbarc(i)=cornproduced(Iprice(i),Ccornsupply,Ecornsupply) 
        diff2=(hbarc(i)-hbar(i))^2 
        if diff2>100 
            hbar(i)=hbar(i)+0.5*(hbarc(i)-hbar(i)) 
             
        end 
    end  
    i=i+1; 
end 
hbari=hbar; 
save ('hbari', 'hbari'); 
si=(lb:500:ub)'; 
xs=[ones(size(si)) si si.^2 si.^3]; 
beta=regress(Ecornpgs', xs); 
psi=[psi0; psi1; psi2; psi3] 
out=sum((psi-beta).^2) 
load bestpsi 
v=size(psitry,1); 
psitry(v+1,:)=psi; 
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outtry(v+1)=out; 
save ('bestpsi', 'psitry','outtry'); 
 
 
eqprice.m 
%% possible gas prices 
gasprice=pgas*v; 
noethprice=(max(A-St,0)/Ccorndemand)^(1/Ecorndemand)*ones(size(gasprice)); 
nonmanprice=(chsi*((lambda*gasprice)+((lambda-1)*tax+costeth)+taxcredit)); 
pcorn=pgas*chsi:.01:40.00; 
m=length(v); 
NEdem=Ccorndemand*pcorn.^Ecorndemand; 
SE=max(((A-St).*(ones(size(NEdem)))-NEdem)*chsi,zeros(size(NEdem))); 
Peth=(pcorn./chsi)+costeth; 
Pf=alpha*ones(m,1)*(Peth+tax-taxcredit)+(1-
alpha)*(pgas+tax)*(ones(m,1).*v')*ones(size(Peth));%mandate not binding 
demfuel=Cfueldemand.*Pf.^Efueldemand; 
SF=(ones(m,1)*SE)./alpha; 
sqe=(SF-demfuel).^2; 
[dumb ind]=min(sqe'); 
pc1=pcorn(ind)'; 
[finalprice Q]=max([noethprice; nonmanprice; pc1']); 
highest=5000*ones(size(finalprice)); 
finalprice=min([finalprice;highest]); 
out=finalprice*probgp'; 
 
 
 findsi.m 
 
function out=findsi(si,pgas, Ccorndemans, Ecorndemand, Cfueldemand, 
Efueldemand, A, alpha, chsi, r, psi0, psi1, psi2, psi3,k,v,probgp, lambda, 
tax, taxcredit, costeth) 
for i=1:length(si) 
cornp=eqprice(pgas, Ccorndemans, Ecorndemand, Cfueldemand, Efueldemand, A, 
si(i), alpha, chsi,v, probgp, lambda, tax, taxcredit, costeth); 
wrong(i)=cornp+k-(psi0+psi1*si(i)+psi2*si^2+psi3*si^3)/(1+r); 
end 
out=(wrong.^2); 
if si<0 
out=900000*(-si)+9000; 
end 
 
 
cornproduced.m 
 
 function out=cornproduced(cornprice, constant, elasticity) 
out=constant.*cornprice.^elasticity; 
 
